SUBJECT TERMS
This shift was paralleled by renewed regionalism in the U.S. as we responded to perceived shortcomings in the multilateral trading system we had so long supported, perceived threats of new regional trading blocs in Europe and Asia, and frustration over our continuing trade deficit.
We were also driven, in part, by seeing U.S. exports to Latin America decline from 17% of our exports to 13%.
(USTR estimated that U.S. exporters lost over $I00 billion during the decade in sales to Latin America which, according to congressional sources, cost the U.S. over one million jobs.)
From the other side, the U.S. market was increasingly seen as the key to Latin American economic success as over 40% of its foreign trade was with the U.S. Further, the Latins had seen this trade increase by i0 percentage points in the 1980's with manufacturing leading the way.
Whatever joy this picture brought for the Latin side, however, was more than offset by its debt problems ($422 billion) and consequent lack of investment and restriction of loans and credits. The U.S., on its side, had to be concerned that it had $50 billion worth of investments in Latin America, almost twothirds of all U.S. investments in developing countries.
ENTERPRISE FOR THE AMERICAS INITIATIVE:
In an effort to provide help to these new democratic leaders and their governments, President Bush announced the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI) on June 27, 1990.
In his remarks at the announcement, the President set the parameters for that help, noting that "prosperity in our hemisphere depends on trade, not 
PROGRESS TO DATE:
After a somewhat confused initial response, in which they alternated between cautious enthusiasm and complaints about the lack of money budgeted for the plan and its lack of Growing Latin American enthusiasm and the lack of precision in the EAI has led Latin leaders to broaden their own proposals.
Ironically, the fact that the EAI proposal raises more questions than answers, a challenge rather than a U.S.-imposed solution, may give it more long-term impact than a less provocative
proposal. This may lead to increased engagement by Latin leaders, more important than ever since the end of the Cold War raises the possibility of decreasing U.S. interest in and support for Latin America in the years immediately ahead.
In this sense, the EAI has encouraged Latin leaders to speed-up and strengthen the formation of their own sub-regional groups, at least in part because they prefer to negotiate framework agreements with the U.S. on a multilateral rather than a bilateral basis. While the real value of these agreements remains to be seen, with little prospect for serious progress until the NAFTA is completed, at a minimum they should serve as vehicles to expand liberalized trade in the hemisphere, even if full free trade is not achieved. They should also serve to strengthen democracy in the region as the economic cost of political backsliding in the future is likely to rise.
Luigi Einaudi, the U.S. ambassador to the OAS, summed up the situation neatly at the 1991 General Assembly meeting in 
